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Abstract. We consider prophet inequalities in a setting where agents
correspond to both elements in a matroid and vertices in a graph. A set of
agents is feasible if they form both an independent set in the matroid and
an independent set in the graph. Our main result is an ex-ante 1
2(d+1)
-
prophet inequality, where d is a graph parameter upper-bounded by the
maximum size of an independent set in the neighborhood of any vertex.
We establish this result through a framework that sets both dynamic
prices for elements in the matroid (using the method of balanced thresh-
olds), and static but discriminatory prices for vertices in the graph (mo-
tivated by recent developments in approximate dynamic programming).
The threshold for accepting an agent is then the sum of these two prices.
We show that for graphs induced by a certain family of interval-
scheduling constraints, the value of d is 1. Our framework thus pro-
vides the first constant-factor prophet inequality when there are both
matroid-independence constraints and interval-scheduling constraints. It
also unifies and improves several results from the literature, leading to a
1
2
-prophet inequality when agents have XOS valuation functions over a
set of items and use them for a finite interval duration, and more gener-
ally, a 1
d+1
-prophet inequality when these items each require a bundle of
d resources to procure.
Keywords: Prophet Inequalities · Posted-price Mechanisms · Approxi-
mate Dynamic Programming.
1 Introduction
Prophet inequalities analyze the performance of online vs. offline algorithms in
sequential selection problems, and have enjoyed a recent surge of uses in posted-
price mechanism design. The typical online selection problem can be described
as follows.
⋆ The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for the 12th Symposium
on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) who made many suggestions that improved
the paper. This is the full version of a one-page abstract from those proceedings.
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A set of T agents is denoted by N = {1, . . . , T }. Each agent t has a valuation
Vt drawn from a known distribution Ft. The valuations are realized indepen-
dently, and revealed sequentially. Each agent must be irrevocably accepted or
rejected upon her valuation being revealed, with the feasibility constraint that
the set of agents accepted by the end must lie in F , a downward-closed collection
of subsets of N . The objective is to maximize the expected sum of valuations of
agents accepted. We will refer to this as the welfare.
The algorithm’s expected welfare is compared to that of a clairvoyant who can
see all the realized valuations beforehand and make “prophetic” accept/reject
decisions. All of our results also hold relative to the stronger ex-ante prophet,
who can choose the correlation between the marginal distributions F1, . . . , FT
to maximize his welfare (but for the algorithm, the valuations are still inde-
pendent). We let OPT denote the prophet’s expected welfare, which equals
E[maxS∈F
∑
t∈S Vt].
In this paper, we analyze the structure where F is defined by the intersection
of a matroid and a graph. Specifically, there is a matroid M = (N, I) and an
undirected graph G = (N,E), both defined on the set of agents N . F then
consists of the subsets S ⊆ N that are both independent in the matroid, i.e.
S ∈ I, and independent in the graph, i.e. {t, t′} /∈ E for all t, t′ ∈ S.
To state our main result, we need the following definitions.
Definition 1. For a matroid M = (N, I), define d1(M) = 0 if I = 2N , and
d1(M) = 1 otherwise.
I = 2N corresponds to the free matroid, under which all subsets are independent.
Definition 2. For a graph G = (N,E), define
d2(G) = max
t∈N
α
(
G
[
{t′ < t : {t, t′} ∈ E}
])
, (1)
where G[·] denotes the subgraph of G induced by a set of vertices, and α(·) denotes
the maximum size of an independent set in a graph.
We explain expression (1). {t, t′} ∈ E implies that t cannot be accepted alongside
t′, and t′ < t implies that t′ could have been accepted before t to “block”
agent t. However, some of these agents t′ may also block each other, in which
case they are adjacent in the induced subgraph G[·]. α(·) counts the maximum
number of such agents that can be simultaneously accepted, and d2(G) takes the
maximum of these numbers over t ∈ N . We note that d2(G) is upper-bounded
by maxt α(G[{t′ : {t, t′} ∈ E}]), the maximum size of an independent set in the
neighborhood of any vertex.
Theorem 1. For any matroid M and graph G, the expected welfare of an online
algorithm is at least
1
(d1(M) + 1)(d2(G) + 1)
·OPT.
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Our algorithm is order-aware, in that it needs to assume the agents’ valuations
will be revealed in the given order 1, . . . , T . Before elaborating on our techniques
in Section 1.2, we outline the implications of our Theorem 1 and various gener-
alizations relative to the literature, and describe settings where d2(G) is small.
1.1 Our Results, in relation to Previous Results
In Theorem 1, d2(G) is small if an agent cannot be blocked by many agents that
don’t block each other. One setting where this arises is when the agents arrive in
order 1, . . . , T , each requesting service for a duration starting with her time of
arrival, and need to be served by a single server. Formally, associated with the
agents are intervals I1 = [ℓ1, u1], . . . , IT = [ℓT , uT ] satisfying ℓ1 ≤ . . . ≤ ℓT , and
a set of agents S can be feasibly served if
|{t ∈ S : z ∈ It}| ≤ 1 ∀ z ∈ [ℓ1,max
t
ut]. (2)
In the graph G induced by constraints (2), two agents are adjacent if their
intervals overlap. For an agent t, any agents t′ < t with It′ ∩ It 6= ∅ must have It′
contain the point ℓt, since ℓt′ ≤ ℓt and the intervals are contiguous. Therefore,
all of these agents t′ are also adjacent to each other in G through the point ℓt,
which implies that d2(G) ≤ 1.
We contrast this with a different type of interval constraint where the agents
request service starting from a common point in time ℓ, and there is a time-
dependent service capacity B(z) ∈ Z≥0 for all z ≥ ℓ. The agents request intervals
I
′
1 = [ℓ, u
′
1], . . . , I
′
T = [ℓ, u
′
T ], and a set of agents S can be feasibly served if
|{t ∈ S : z ∈ It}| ≤ B(z) ∀ z ≥ ℓ. (3)
In (3), since the intervals starting from the same point are nested, the constraints
can be captured by a laminar matroid M , with d1(M) ≤ 1.
Therefore, Theorem 1 shows that the guarantee relative to the ex-ante prophet
is at least 1(d1(M)+1)(d2(G)+1) ≥ 1/4 under the combination of constraints (2)
and (3). This could model an online rectangle packing problem, where the hor-
izontal projections have increasing left-boundaries and must satisfy (2), while
the vertical projections have identical top-boundaries and must satisfy (3). More
generally, Theorem 1 implies a (1/4)-guarantee for any online matroid selection
problem under the additional constraint that each agent requires a processing
time, during which no other agent can be served even if they are independent
in the matroid. To our knowledge, our framework provides the first constant-
factor guarantee under the combined families of feasibility constraints. Indeed,
the constraints (2) do not correspond to a matroid.3 Meanwhile, (3) cannot be
captured by the pairwise independence constraints of a graph. If E = ∅ and the
3 Consider an example where intervals I2, . . . , IT are disjoint, but interval I1 is long
and overlaps all of them. In this case, constraints (2) do not correspond to a matroid,
and in fact require the intersection of Ω(T ) matroids to capture. Hence, applying a
result from [11] would not yield a constant-factor guarantee.
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graph imposes no feasibility constraints, then d2(G) = 0 and the guarantee from
Theorem 1 is 1/2, which is the matroid prophet inequality from [11].
In Section 3, we consider the generalized setting studied in [8,5], where the
agents have XOS valuation functions over a set of items. We impose matroid- and
graph- independence constraints on the subset of items allocated to the agents
by the end, and show that the guarantee of 1(d1(M)+1)(d2(G)+1) from Theorem 1
still holds (Theorem 2). If the matroid is free, then d1(M) = 0, and a corollary of
Theorem 2 is that the 12 -guarantee for XOS from [8] still holds if the agents use
the items allocated to them for a finite interval duration (instead of keeping the
items forever). More generally, we show that if each item requires a bundle of at
most d underlying resources (possibly for a finite interval duration) to procure,
then d2(G) ≤ d, leading to a guarantee of 1/(d+ 1) (Proposition 6).
1.2 Our Techniques, in relation to Previous Techniques
Central to the development of prophet inequalities is the notion of a residual
function. In the basic setting with an arbitrary feasible collection F , if Y ∈ F is
the set of agents that have already been accepted, then its residual is defined as
R(Y ) = EV˜1,...,V˜T
[
max
S:S∪Y∈F
∑
t∈S
V˜t
]
, (4)
where V˜1, . . . , V˜T is a freshly sampled set of valuations. The algorithm decides
whether to accept an agent t by comparing the actual realization of Vt with the
simulated threshold of γ(R(Y )− R(Y ∪ {t})), where γ is a constant in (0, 1). γ
is chosen depending4 on F to balance the thresholds—for example, if F is the
independent sets of a matroid, then γ = 1/2 ensures that the thresholds are
neither too high nor too low [11]. In the simplest XOS-valuation setting with
only item capacity constraints, the difference in residuals decomposes very nicely
as a sum of item-prices [8]. It is important, however, that these residuals and
prices are always computed based on a prophet who “starts over” and considers
every agent 1, . . . , T , even when some agents have already come and gone.
Unfortunately, this “starting over” does not exploit the temporal aspect of
graph-independence constraints, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 1. T agents arrive in order, with agent 1 requesting service for a long
interval I1 = [1, T+1], and each agent t ≥ 2 requesting service for a short interval
It = [t, t + 1/2]. There is a single server, so a set of agents S is feasible if and
only if S satisfies constraints (2). Agent 1 has valuation C+Tεε with probability
ε, and valuation 0 otherwise, where C, ε > 0 are constants. Agents 2, . . . , T
deterministically have valuation 1.
Consider the thresholds set by the residual function (4) on Example 1. If no
agents have been taken, i.e. Y = ∅, then
R(∅) =
C + Tε
ε
· ε+ (T − 1)(1− ε) = C + T − 1 + ε.
4 We note, however, that γ does not depend on the given valuation distributions.
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Meanwhile, taking any agent t ≥ 2 prevents the prophet from taking agent 1,
so R({2}) = . . . = R({T }) = T − 1.5 Therefore, when Y = ∅, the threshold
for agents t ≥ 2 is γ(R(∅) − R({t})) = γ(C + ε). By setting C = 1/γ, we can
always construct an instance where these thresholds exceed 1, rejecting all agents
2, . . . , T . The algorithm’s welfare is only C+Tεε · ε = C +Tε, while the prophet’s
welfare is OPT = R(∅) ≈ C + T . By choosing T ≫ C and ε = o(1/T ), the
algorithm’s welfare can be made an arbitrarily small fraction of OPT.
The residual-based approach6 performed poorly on Example 1 because the
first agent’s existence continued to inflate the thresholds of agents 2, . . . , T , even
after she had already come and gone. To improve upon it, we incorporate dy-
namic programming, which is particularly designed to account for these temporal
dynamics. Motivated by recent developments in approximate dynamic program-
ming [20,17], we consider the following modification to the residual function.
For each agent t, let x∗t denote the probability that she is accepted by the
prophet, and let y∗t denote her expected valuation conditional on being accepted.
We then define πt as follows, using backward induction over t = T, T − 1, . . . , 1:
πt =
∑
t′>t:{t,t′}∈E
x∗t′ ·max{y
∗
t′ − πt′ , 0}. (5)
πt can be interpreted as the “cost” of accepting agent t with respect to the
graph-independence constraints. Indeed, for all agents t′ > t, the summand in
(5) is the already-computed “surplus” earned by the prophet on agent t′, and
the sum is over all future surpluses t′ which are blocked by accepting agent t.
Our modified residual function is based on a “restricted” prophet, who sees
valuations Vˆ1, . . . , VˆT that have been reduced in two ways. First, the restricted
prophet only sees a non-zero valuation for an agent t if the actual prophet would
have accepted t on that sample path (this is formalized in Section 2); otherwise,
the agent’s valuation is zero. Second, the valuation of every agent t is further
reduced by πt, with πt as defined in (5). Our restricted residual function is then
Rˆ(Y ) = EVˆ1,...,VˆT
[
max
S:S∪Y∈I
∑
t∈S
Vˆt
]
, (6)
and we define threshold τ(t|Y ) = 1d1(M)+1 (Rˆ(Y ) − Rˆ(Y ∪ {t})). Our algorithm
accepts an agent t if and only if she is both feasible and satisfies
Vt ≥ τ(t|Y ) + πt. (7)
Returning to Example 1, we would have π2 = . . . = πT = 0 (because agents
t ≥ 2 do not block any future agents), and π1 ≈ T − 1. In this case, the matroid
5 Note that in our definition (4), taking an agent t does not prevent the prophet from
taking t again (S and Y need not be disjoint), although this distinction is purely for
convenience and not critical.
6 There are also more extensive frameworks [5,16], but to the best of our knowledge,
they still perform poorly on Example 1, as we discuss in Appendix A.
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is free (because all the constraints are captured by the graph), so τ(t|Y ) = 0 and
our algorithm ends up accepting every agent t using decision rule (7), which is
the optimal control for Example 1.
In general, τ(t|Y ) represents our price for the matroid and πt represents our
price for the graph. πt discriminates based on the agent t, looking at which
agents t′ > t get blocked, but is static in that it does not depend on the current
state Y . By contrast, τ(t|Y ) dynamically considers the addition of element t
to the current Y , but otherwise does not discriminate based on the agent t. A
further contribution of our work is that we show how both τ(t|Y ) and πt can be
computed efficiently when G is induced by an intersection of interval-scheduling
constraints of the form (2), by implementing an ex-ante relaxation (Section 2.1).
Finally, we describe our analysis, which consists of two steps. First, we show
that the algorithm earns at least 1d1(M)+1 Rˆ(∅), where Rˆ(∅) represents the welfare
of the restricted prophet (Lemma 1). Lemma 1 differs from the original matroid
prophet inequality in that the algorithm is further constrained by the graph, but
gets to play against a prophet who sees valuations Vˆt which have been reduced by
πt. If the matroid is free and thus d1(M) = 0, then Lemma 1 is still non-trivial,
as it says that the algorithm, constrained by the graph, can match the restricted
prophet in welfare. Our analysis concludes by showing that the restricted prophet
earns at least 1d2(G)+1 times the welfare of the actual prophet (Lemma 2).
A general take-away from our paper is that the way in which constraints are
modeled can lead to different algorithms and prophet inequalities. For example,
simple constraints on item supplies can be modeled either with a partition ma-
troid or by adding edges to our graph, which results in substantially different
algorithms. In general, is there a systematic way of dividing up constraints be-
tween feasibility structures to yield the best prophet inequality? We leave this
open as interesting future work.
1.3 Other Related Work
Prophet inequalities originated in [13,14], and the connection to posted-price
mechanism design was discovered in [1]. There has since been a surge of liter-
ature on prophet inequalities, and we defer a complete literature review to the
survey by Lucier [16]. Our work can be classified as having a fixed (adversarial)
arrival order, which can be contrasted with random-order prophet inequalities
[7]; general but structured feasible sets, which can be contrasted with arbitrary
feasible sets [18] or refined results on rank-1 matroids [3]; and additive rewards,
a special case of combinatorial rewards [19]. Our paper is most related to the
existing work involving matroids [11,6,5] and XOS valuation functions [8,5]. We
should mention that interval-scheduling constraints have also been studied in
[10,2], where it is shown that with no assumptions on the intervals, the guaran-
tee relative to the prophet is at most O(log logL/ logL), where L is the length
of (number of items in) the longest interval. That is, with no assumptions on
the intervals, a constant-factor is impossible.
Finally, we discuss two recent developments in approximate dynamic pro-
gramming (ADP) from which we borrow techniques. [20] has developed an ADP-
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based algorithm which is within 1/2 of the optimal DP in an application with
reusable resources. This is the motivation behind our interval-scheduling con-
straints of the form (2). [17] has established a guarantee of 1/(d+1) in a setting
where each item uses up to d resources.
Our work makes further contributions beyond these existing results in three
ways. First and most importantly, we show how to include ADP-based thresholds
in the matroid residual function and analyze feasible sets defined by the inter-
section of a matroid and a graph. Second, we unify the two existing ADP results
by abstracting them using a graph, which leads to a more general result—we can
allow for items to use multiple (up to d) resources, each for a different duration.
Finally, we extend their guarantees to be relative to the prophet (instead of the
optimal DP), and also show how they can be applied on combinatorial auctions
(instead of assortment optimization).
2 Proof of Theorem 1
We first summarize and formalize the notation and definitions from the Intro-
duction, for the basic setting in Theorem 1.
Online Selection Problem. There is a ground set of agents N = {1, . . . , T }
with valuations V1, . . . , VT drawn independently from marginal distributions
F1, . . . , FT . There is a matroid M = (N, I) defined on the ground set, where
I is a collection of subsets of N satisfying: (i) ∅ ∈ I; (ii) if S ∈ I and S′ ⊆ S
then S′ ∈ I; and (iii) for S, S′ ∈ I with |S| > |S′|, there exists t ∈ S \ S′ such
that S′ ∪ {t} ∈ I (we refer to [12] for more background on matroids and their
use in optimization). There is also a graph G = (N,E) defined on N , where E
is a collection of size-2 subsets of N . We let F denote the collection of feasible
sets, where a set of agents S is feasible if it is both independent in the matroid
(i.e. S ∈ I) and independent in the graph (i.e. {t, t′} /∈ E for all t, t′ ∈ S). The
goal is to accept a max-value feasible set of agents as compared to a prophet.
Prophet. The prophet chooses a joint valuation distribution over RT with
marginals F1, . . . , FT . On every realization, he sees the valuations and then se-
lects a feasible set of agents. Let x∗t denote the probability that agent t is selected,
and let y∗t denote her expected valuation conditional on being selected. Let OPT
denote the prophet’s expected welfare, which equals
∑T
t=1 y
∗
t x
∗
t , by the linearity
of expectation. Furthermore, since on every realization, the prophet’s selection
must be independent in both the matroid and the graph, the vector x∗ satisfies∑
t∈S
x∗t ≤ rank(S) ∀ S ⊆ N (8)
∑
t∈S
x∗t ≤ α(G[S]) ∀ S = {t
′ < t : {t, t′} ∈ E}, for some t ∈ N (9)
where rank(S) = maxS′⊆S,S′∈I |S′| denotes the max-cardinality matroid inde-
pendent set contained within S, and α(G[S]) denotes the max-cardinality graph
independent set contained within S. Note that we have relaxed constraints (9)
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to only a specific family of sets S, which are sufficient for Theorem 1 and com-
putationally simpler.
Dynamic Programming Coefficients.Having defined x∗t and y
∗
t , we compute
πt =
∑
t′>t:{t,t′}∈E x
∗
t′ [y
∗
t′−πt′ ]
+ by backward induction over t = T, T −1, . . . , 1,
as in (5). We use [·]+ to denote the operator max{·, 0}.
We note that such a backward-induction computation is only possible because
we have assumed that the arrival order 1, . . . , T is known in advance.
Restricted Prophet. The restricted prophet sees valuations Vˆ = (Vˆ1, . . . , VˆT )
drawn according to a joint distribution Dˆ defined as follows. First, an inde-
pendent set Iˆ in the matroid (which need not be independent in the graph) is
randomly selected in a way such that Pr[t ∈ Iˆ] = x∗t for all t ∈ N (this is pos-
sible because x∗ lies in the matroid polytope defined by (8)—we elaborate on
this in Section 2.1). The restricted prophet then sees Vˆt = y
∗
t − πt if t ∈ Iˆ, and
Vˆt = −πt otherwise. The residual function (6) based on the restricted prophet is
Rˆ(Y ) = E
Vˆ∼Dˆ[maxS:S∪Y ∈I
∑
t∈S Vˆt]. We note that if Y /∈ I, then Rˆ(Y ) = −∞.
We note that Rˆ(∅) =
∑T
t=1 x
∗
t [y
∗
t −πt]
+. This is because on every realization
of Vˆ, the optimal S to take is the set of agents t with Vˆt > 0, which is guaranteed
to be independent in the matroid (since all such agents must have had Vˆt =
y∗t − πt). A corollary is that if the graph is empty and πt = 0 for all t, then the
restricted prophet earns
∑T
t=1 y
∗
t x
∗
t , matching the welfare of the actual prophet
despite seeing “binarized” valuations Vˆt. This reduction was introduced in [15].
Algorithm. The algorithm, having already accepted agents in Y , accepts an
agent t if and only if Y ∪ {t} is independent in the graph and Vt ≥ τ(t|Y ) + πt,
as defined in (7). Note that τ(t|Y ) = 1d1(M)+1 (Rˆ(Y ) − Rˆ(Y ∪ {t})), and we do
not need to explicitly check that Y ∪ {t} is independent in the matroid, because
if not, then τ(t|Y ) =∞. Let ALG denote the expected welfare of this algorithm.
We note that this algorithm requires computing the prophet’s values of x∗t , y
∗
t ,
and evaluating expectations over the restricted prophet’s correlated distribution
Dˆ. We ignore computational issues in this section and discuss how the algorithm
can be implemented via an ex-ante relaxation in Section 2.1.
We now establish Theorem 1, the conceptual result that the gap between
an online algorithm and any prophet is at most (d1(M) + 1)(d2(G) + 1) (with
d1(M), d2(G) as defined in Definition 1–2), via a sequence of two lemmas.
Lemma 1. The algorithm earns at least 1d1(M)+1 times the welfare of the re-
stricted prophet. That is, ALG ≥ 1d1(M)+1 Rˆ(∅).
Proof. Let Y denote the random set of agents accepted at the end of the algo-
rithm, and for all t = 1, . . . , T , let Yt denote Y ∩ {1, . . . , t}, the set of agents
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accepted up to and including agent t. The algorithm’s expected welfare equals
ALG = E
[∑
t∈Y
(Vt − τ(t|Yt−1)) +
∑
t∈Y
τ(t|Yt−1)
]
= E
[∑
t∈Y
(Vt − τ(t|Yt−1)) +
1
d1(M) + 1
∑
t∈Y
(Rˆ(Yt−1)− Rˆ(Yt−1 ∪ {t}))
]
=
1
d1(M) + 1
Rˆ(∅) + E
[∑
t∈Y
(Vt − τ(t|Yt−1))
]
−
1
d1(M) + 1
E[Rˆ(Y )] (10)
where the second equality follows from the definition of τ , and the third equality
follows from the fact that Yt−1 ∪ {t} = Yt for all t ∈ Y , causing the latter sum
to telescope.
We now upper-bound the negative term from (10) in the following proposi-
tion. It mostly follows from existing results [11,15], so its proof is deferred to the
appendix. It relies on the submodularity of the matroid residual function. Since
our restricted residual function considers a prophet who is only constrained by
the matroid, our function is also submodular.
Proposition 1. 1d1(M)+1 Rˆ(Y ) ≤
∑T
t=1 x
∗
t [y
∗
t − τ(t|Yt−1)− πt]
+.
In the meantime, we would like to lower-bound the second term from (10),
which represents the “surplus” earned by the algorithm beyond the thresholds
τ(t|Yt−1), while being constrained by both matroid and graph independence.
The following proposition is novel and crucial to our analysis.
Proposition 2. E
[∑
t∈Y (Vt − τ(t|Yt−1))
]
≥ E
[∑T
t=1 x
∗
t [y
∗
t − τ(t|Yt−1)− πt]
+
]
.
Proof (of Proposition 2).We decompose the LHS as E
[∑
t∈Y (Vt − τ(t|Yt−1)− πt)
]
+
E
[∑
t∈Y πt
]
and analyze the two expectations separately.
The first expectation can be re-written as
E
[∑
t∈Y
(Vt − τ(t|Yt−1)− πt)
]
=
T∑
t=1
EYt−1
[
EVt [1(t ∈ Y ) · (Vt − τ(t|Yt−1)− πt)|Yt−1]
]
(11)
after using both the linearity of expectation and the tower property of conditional
expectation. Now, recall that as agent t arrives, she is accepted if and only if
she is feasible (in both the matroid and graph), and Vt − τ(t|Yt−1) − πt ≥ 0. If
Yt−1∪{t} does not form an independent set in the matroid, then τ(t|Yt−1) =∞,
since Rˆ(Yt−1 ∪{t}) is understood to equal −∞ when the maximization problem
in the residual is infeasible. Therefore, we can write
1(t ∈ Y ) · (Vt − τ(t|Yt−1)− πt) = Feas
G(Yt−1 ∪ {t}) · [Vt − τ(t|Yt−1)− πt]
+,
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where FeasG(Yt−1 ∪ {t}) is the indicator random variable for Yt−1 ∪ {t} forming
an independent set in the graph. Making this substitution for every agent t on
the RHS of (11), we get that it equals
T∑
t=1
EYt−1
[
Feas
G(Yt−1 ∪ {t}) · EVt
[
[Vt − τ(t|Yt−1)− πt]
+
]]
, (12)
where we have used the fact that Vt is independent from Yt−1.
Meanwhile, the second expectation can be re-written as
E
[∑
t∈Y
πt
]
= E

∑
t∈Y
∑
t′>t:{t,t′}∈E
x∗t′ [y
∗
t′ − πt′ ]
+


= E

 T∑
t′=1
x∗t′ [y
∗
t′ − πt′ ]
+
( ∑
t<t′:{t,t′}∈E
1(t ∈ Y )
)
= E
[
T∑
t′=1
x∗t′ [y
∗
t′ − πt′ ]
+(1− FeasG(Yt′−1 ∪ {t
′}))
]
(13)
where the first equality applies the definition of πt from (5), the second equality
switches sums, and the third equality holds because agent t′ forms an indepen-
dent set with Yt′−1 in the graph if and only if none of its neighbors t < t
′ have
been accepted into Y .
Now, note that the sum of expressions (12) and (13) can be rewritten as
T∑
t=1
EYt−1
[
Feas
G(Yt−1 ∪ {t}) · EVt
[
[Vt − τ(t|Yt−1)− πt]
+
]]
+
T∑
t=1
EYt−1
[
(1 − FeasG(Yt−1 ∪ {t})) · x
∗
t [y
∗
t − πt]
+
]
,
which is lower-bounded by
T∑
t=1
EYt−1
[
min
{
EVt
[
[Vt − τ(t|Yt−1)− πt]
+
]
, x∗t · [y
∗
t − πt]
+
}]
.
We would like to further lower-bound both of the terms inside the min{·} oper-
ator, by x∗t · [y
∗
t − τ(t|Yt−1) − πt]
+. For the second term, this is obvious, since
the thresholds τ(t|Yt−1) are non-negative. For the first term, note that Vt takes
an average value of y∗t on an x
∗
t -fraction of sample paths. Hence by Jensen’s
inequality, the expectation over Vt is at least x
∗
t [y
∗
t − τ(t|Yt−1) − πt]
+ (the [·]+
operator is convex).
Returning to the fact that the sum of expressions (12) and (13) was the LHS
of the original inequality, this completes the proof of Proposition 2. 
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Equipped with Propositions 1–2, the proof of Lemma 1 now follows from (10).
Indeed, taking an expectation over Y on both sides in the result of Proposition 1,
(10) implies that ALG ≥ 1d1(M)+1 Rˆ(∅), which is the desired result. 
Lemma 2. The restricted prophet earns at least 1d2(G)+1 times the welfare of
the actual prophet. That is, Rˆ(∅) ≥ 1d2(G)+1 · OPT.
Proof. Recall that Rˆ(∅) =
∑T
t=1 x
∗
t [y
∗
t −πt]
+. We apply the definition of πt from
(5) and switch sums to derive that
T∑
t=1
x∗t [y
∗
t − πt]
+ ≥
T∑
t=1
x∗t y
∗
t −
T∑
t=1
x∗tπt
=
T∑
t=1
x∗t y
∗
t −
T∑
t=1
x∗t
∑
t′>t:{t,t′}∈E
x∗t′ [y
∗
t′ − πt′ ]
+
=
T∑
t=1
x∗t y
∗
t −
T∑
t′=1
x∗t′ [y
∗
t′ − πt′ ]
+
( ∑
t<t′:{t,t′}∈E
x∗t
)
.
Now, using the fact that the prophet’s values of x∗t satisfy (9), the sum in paren-
theses is upper-bounded by α(G[{t < t′ : {t, t′} ∈ E}]) for all t′ = 1, . . . , T . By
Definition 2, all of these values are upper-bounded by d2(G). Therefore, since
x∗t′ [y
∗
t′ − πt′ ]
+ ≥ 0, we have that
T∑
t=1
x∗t [y
∗
t − πt]
+ ≥
T∑
t=1
x∗t y
∗
t − d2(G)
T∑
t′=1
x∗t′ [y
∗
t′ − πt′ ]
+,
and rearranging yields
∑T
t=1 x
∗
t [y
∗
t − πt]
+ ≥ 1d2(G)+1
∑T
t=1 x
∗
t y
∗
t =
OPT
d2(G)+1
. 
2.1 Computing and Constructing the Prophet’s Distribution via an
Ex-ante Relaxation
In this section we establish computational efficiency assuming that the graph G
is induced by d-dimensional interval-scheduling constraints. We use an ex-ante
relaxation defined by an LP, and establish three facts:
1. Theorem 1 still holds if we replace the prophet with this ex-ante relaxation,
resulting in a guarantee of 1(d1(M)+1)(d+1) (because d2(G) ≤ d);
2. Our algorithm based on this ex-ante relaxation is computationally efficient;
3. The ex-ante relaxation upper-bounds the welfare of any prophet.
These facts together show that a computationally-efficient algorithm can earn
at least 1(d1(M)+1)(d+1) times the welfare of any prophet.
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Definition 3 (d-dimensional Interval-scheduling Constraints). The agents
arrive at times 1, . . . , T to be served by J different resources. Each agent t re-
quests the attention of up to d resources, for different durations of time starting
from t. Formally, associated with agent t are intervals {Ijt = [t, u
j
t ] : j ∈ Ut},
where Ut is a set of at most d resources, with u
j
t ≥ t for all j ∈ Ut.
An agent t can be served only if all of the resources in Ut are available. Thus,
a set of agents is feasible only if their requested intervals are disjoint for every
resource. Agents t, t′ are adjacent in the graph if Ijt ∩ I
j
t′ 6= ∅ for any j.
Definition 4 (Discrete Valuations).We assume that the marginal valuations
are input as discrete distributions. That is, they are supported over a finite set
of K values v1, . . . , vK ∈ R, and for each agent t, we let pkt ≥ 0 denote the
probability that Vt = v
k for every k = 1, . . . ,K, with
∑
k p
k
t = 1.
Definition 5 (Ex-ante Relaxation). The ex-ante relaxation is defined by the
following LP.
max
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
vkxtk
∑
t∈S
( K∑
k=1
xtk
)
≤ rank(S) ∀ S ⊆ N (14)
∑
t′≤t:j∈Ut′ ,I
j
t′
∋t
( K∑
k=1
xt′k
)
≤ 1 ∀ t ∈ N ; j ∈ Ut (15)
0 ≤ xtk ≤ p
k
t ∀ t ∈ N ; k = 1, . . . ,K
We then consider the values of xtk from an optimal LP solution and define
x∗t =
K∑
k=1
xtk, y
∗
t =
1
x∗t
K∑
k=1
vkxtk
for all agents t (where y∗t = 0 if x
∗
t = 0).
In the LP, variable xtk can be interpreted as the probability that agent t has val-
uation vk and is accepted into the feasible set. Note that in an optimal solution,
y∗t will equal the average value of Vt on its top x
∗
t quantile.
We now formalize the three facts stated above, with the proofs deferred
to the appendix. The second fact references classical results in combinatorial
optimization about separation [9] and rounding [4] for the matroid polytope.
Proposition 3 (fact 1 from above). Our algorithm, when defined based on
the values of x∗t , y
∗
t from the ex-ante relaxation, has welfare at least
1
(d1(M)+1)(d+1)
∑T
t=1 y
∗
t x
∗
t .
Proposition 4 (fact 2 from above). Assuming oracle access to the matroid
rank function, the values of x∗t , y
∗
t from the ex-ante relaxation can be efficiently
computed. Furthermore, the restricted prophet’s correlated distribution Dˆ has a
compact representation which can be efficiently computed.
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Proposition 5 (fact 3 from above). The expected welfare of any prophet,
who can choose the correlation between V1, . . . , VT and select a feasible S ∈ F
maximizing
∑
t∈S Vt on every realization, is upper-bounded by the optimal LP
value of
∑T
t=1 y
∗
t x
∗
t .
3 Generalization to XOS Combinatorial Auctions
We generalize our result to a setting where each agent has a random valuation
function over a set of items, and the graph and matroid constraints are defined
on the items. An agent’s valuation function is realized upon arrival, and the set
of items allocated to the agent must then be decided. Specifically, there are T
agents and a set of items N . There is a matroid (N, I) and a graph (N,E) defined
over these items, and the total set of items allocated must be both independent
in the matroid and the graph.
We assume that N is partitioned into sets N1, . . . , NT such that agent t can
only be given items in Nt. This does not lose generality, in that we can always
replace an item in N with a clique in the graph over N1∪. . .∪NT , whose vertices
are all adjacent to the same neighbors. The copies of the item forming a clique
ensures that at most one of them can be taken, while not increasing the constant
d2(G) for the graph (because they all block each other).
An allocation is denoted by (Y1, . . . , YT ) ⊆
∏T
t=1 2
Nt , and let Y t = (Y1, . . . , Yt).
Sometimes we abuse notation to assume Y t = Y1 ∪ · · · ∪ Yt. The set of feasible
allocations is
F = {(Y1, . . . , YT ) ⊆
∏
t
2Nt : Y1 ∪ · · · ∪ YT independent in M and G}.
We have similar definitions of d1(M) and d2(M) as before. d1(M) = 0 if
I = 2N , and d1(M) = 1 otherwise. d2(G) = maxi∈Nt:t∈[T ] α
(
G
[
{i′ ∈ Nt′ :
{i, i′} ∈ E, t′ < t}
])
, where G[·] denotes the subgraph of G induced by a set of
vertices, and α(·) denotes the maximum size of an independent set in a graph.
Each agent t has a random valuation function vt : 2
Nt → R≥0 drawn from a
known distribution. At time t, agent t’s valuation function realizes independently
to a valuation function vkt with probability p
k
t for k = 1, . . . ,K. Then, the set
of items Yt ⊆ Nt allocated to the agent is decided. We require the all valuation
functions to be fractionally-subadditive, i.e. XOS.
Definition 6. For a set of items Nt, a valuation function vt : 2
Nt → R is XOS,
or fractionally-subadditive, if it can be written as a maximum of a collection of
additive functions:
vt(S) = max
ℓ∈[L]
vℓ(S) ∀ S ⊆ Nt,
where each vℓ is an additive
7 valuation function.
7 A valuation function v is additive if v(S) + v(S′) = v(S ∪ S′) for all disjoint subsets
of items S and S′.
14 Baek and Ma
We now formalize the prophet and algorithm.
Prophet. As before, we compare our online algorithm to a prophet who is able
to choose an arbitrary correlated distribution D∗ over v1, . . . , vT . Furthermore,
for every realization of the valuation functions v = (v1, . . . , vT ), we define the
prophet’s allocation to be Alloc∗(v) = (Alloc∗(v)1, . . . ,Alloc
∗(v)T ), which always
satisfies
Alloc
∗(v) ∈ argmax
(Y1,...,YT )∈F
T∑
t=1
vt(Yt).
Let xk∗t (S) = Prv∼D∗(Alloc
∗(v)t = S|vt = v
k
t ) be the conditional probability
that the prophet chooses to allocate S ⊆ Nt to agent t given that vt realizes to
vkt . Then, by linearity of expectation, the prophet’s value is
OPT =
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pkt
∑
S⊆Nt
xk∗t (S)v
k
t (S). (16)
Since the prophet’s allocation must be independent in the graph on every
realization, for every S = S1 ∪ · · · ∪ ST ⊆ N , the following must be satisfied:
T∑
t=1
∑
Jt⊆Nt
1[Jt allocated]
∑
i∈Jt
1[i ∈ St] ≤ α(G[S]).
That is, the number of items in S that is taken must not be greater than the size
of the biggest independent set in the graph induced by S. By taking expectations,
we get:
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pkt
∑
Jt⊆Nt
xk∗t (Jt)
∑
i∈Jt
1[i ∈ St] ≤ α(G[S]). (17)
XOS Decomposition. For S ⊆ Nt, consider the valuation vkt (S). Since v
k
t is
XOS, it can be written as vkt (S) = maxℓ∈[L]wℓ(S), where each wℓ : 2
Nt → R is
an additive function. Let ukt (i, S) be the value of item i for the additive function
that supports vkt (S). That is, if v
k
t (S) = wℓ(S), then let u
k
t (i, S) = wℓ({i}) for
all i ∈ S.
The following property holds for any XOS function vkt :
vkt (J) ≥
∑
i∈J
ukt (i, S) ∀J ⊆ S ⊆ Nt, (18)
since the additive function that supports S has exactly the value
∑
i∈J u
k
t (i, S),
so vkt (J) can only be higher. This property is also used in [8].
Dynamic Programming Coefficients. Define πt(i) and uˆ
k
t (i, S) recursively
using backwards induction over all t = T, T − 1, . . . , 1, S ⊆ Nt, and i ∈ Nt:
πt(i) =
∑
t′>t
K∑
k=1
pkt′
∑
S′⊆Nt′
xk∗t′ (S
′)
∑
i′∈S′
uˆkt′(i
′, S′)1({i, i′} ∈ E). (19)
uˆkt (i, S) = [u
k
t (i, S)− πt(i)]
+.
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Analogous to (5), πt(i) is the “cost” of allocating item i at time t. We sum over
all future surpluses uˆkt′(i
′, S′) that are “blocked” by G if item i is taken, where
the future surpluses are pre-computed and depend not only on i′ but also on
S′. This is because we need to separately account for the sets S′ which could be
allocated to agent t′, for each possible realization of valuation function vt′ .
Restricted Prophet. For S ⊆ N , we define the restricted residual of S as:
Rˆ(S) = Ev∼D∗ [ max
J⊆Alloc∗(v)
S∪J∈I
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈Jt
uˆt(i,Alloc
∗(v)t)].
where J = (J1, . . . , JT ), and J ⊆ Alloc∗(v) means Jt ⊆ Alloc∗(v)t ∀t. That is,
from the prophet solution Alloc∗(v), we take the subset of it which is feasible
with S and maximizes the restricted rewards. If S /∈ I, Rˆ(S) is defined as −∞. If
S = ∅, then setting J = Alloc∗(v) is a maximizer for every v (because Alloc∗(v) ∈
I), and hence Rˆ(∅) equals
∑T
t=1
∑K
k=1 p
k
t
∑
S⊆Nt
xk∗t (S)
∑
i∈S uˆ
k
t (i, S), which we
refer to as the value of the restricted prophet.
Algorithm. Let τ(S|Y t−1) =
1
d1(M)+1
(R(Y t−1) − R(Y t−1 ∪ S)) denote the
threshold for the matroid at time t, when the set of items taken so far is Y t−1.
Note that τ(S|Y t−1) = ∞ if Y t−1 ∪ S /∈ I. At time t, if the agent’s valuation
realizes to vkt , the algorithm allocates subset
Yt ∈ argmax
S⊆Nt:
S feasible
(
vkt (S)−
∑
i∈S
πt(i)− τ(S|Y t−1)
)
. (20)
That is, the algorithm allocates the feasible subset which has the largest “sur-
plus” over the sum of the two thresholds.
We are now ready to state our generalization of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let N1, . . . , NT be a collection of disjoint items, and let N = N1∪
· · · ∪ NT . Let M = (N, I) be a matroid and G = (N,E) be a graph. If every
realization of the random valuation function vt : 2
Nt → R is XOS for all t ∈ [T ],
then the expected welfare of an online algorithm is at least
1
(d1(M) + 1)(d2(G) + 1)
·OPT,
where OPT is the expected welfare of a prophet who can choose the correlation
between v1, . . . , vT and see their realizations beforehand.
The proof of Theorem 2 is deferred to Appendix C. Below, we also generalize
Definition 3, and bound d2(G) in the setting where every item i ∈ N requests
the attention of up to d resources for a duration of time. When combined, these
results imply a 1(d1(M)+1)(d+1) -guarantee.
Proposition 6. Let J be a set of resources, and let Ui ⊆ J for every i ∈ N with
|Ui| ≤ d. Associated with every item i ∈ Nt are intervals {I
j
i = [t, u
j
i ] : j ∈ Ui}
with uji ≥ t for all j ∈ Ui. An item i ∈ Nt can be allocated at time t only if all
resources in Ui are available. Then, this constraint can be modelled by a graph
G that satisfies d2(G) ≤ d.
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A Why weakly balanced prices do not exist for Example 1
We explain why even the most general framework from [5], which seeks weakly
balanced prices in a deterministic setting, does not appear to yield a constant-
factor guarantee for Example 1. The reasoning is similar to that described in
Section 1.2, with the issue caused by the optimum “starting over”.
Consider Theorem 3.2 from [5] and consider any constants α, β1, and β2.
We construct values of T , C, and ε for which their algorithm based on balanced
prices extracts an arbitrary-small fraction of welfare. We will follow the notation
from Section 3 of [5].
For every agent t, the corresponding outcome space is {∅, acc}, where acc
refers to agent t being accepted while ∅ refers to agent t being rejected. Let
x be the allocation in which only the second agent is accepted. Suppose v is
the valuation profile where the first agent has valuation C+Tεε , which occurs
with probability ε. In this case, v(ALG(v)) = C+Tεε , since the prophet only
allocates the item to the first agent. Then, Fx (the exchange-compatible set)
cannot contain any allocation y that accepts the first agent, because if it did, then
it would not satisfy (y1,x−1) ∈ F . Therefore, it must be that v(OPT(v,Fx)) ≤
T −1. Then, for x and v to satisfy the first constraint in weakly balanced prices,
it must be that
∑
i∈T
pi(xi|x[i−1]) = p2(acc|∅) ≥
1
α
(v(ALG(v)) − v(OPT(v,Fx))) ≥
1
α
(
C
ε
+ 1).
Their posted price mechanism uses prices δ ·Ev[pvi (xi|y)] for δ =
1
β1+max{2β2,1/α}
,
and the aforementioned valuation function realizes with probability ε. Therefore,
the price for agent 2 in the posted price mechanism is greater than
δC
α
+
εδ
α
> 1
if C ≥ αδ . Similarly, the price for agents i = 3, . . . , T will also be greater than 1,
so those agents will never be accepted. Then, the posted-price mechanism will
achieve welfare C + Tε, whereas the prophet will achieve C + T − 1 + ε. As
T → ∞ and ε = o(1/T ), the fraction of welfare achieved by the posted-price
mechanism goes to 0.
B Deferred Proofs
Proof (of Proposition 1). The residual function Rˆ, which involves the prophet
selecting a max-value independent set in a matroid, is submodular by [11]. That
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is, for all subsets S and S′, Rˆ(S ∪ S′) + Rˆ(S ∩ S′) ≤ Rˆ(S) + Rˆ(S′). Applying
this inequality repeatedly yields the following:
Rˆ(Y ) = E
Vˆ
[
max
S:S∪Y∈I
∑
t∈S
(Vˆt − τ(t|Yt−1) + τ(t|Yt−1))
]
= E
Vˆ
[
max
S:S∪Y∈I
(∑
t∈S
(Vˆt − τ(t|Yt−1)) +
1
d1(M) + 1
∑
t∈S
(Rˆ(Yt−1)− Rˆ(Yt−1 ∪ {t}))
)]
≤ E
Vˆ
[
max
S:S∪Y∈I
(∑
t∈S
(Vˆt − τ(t|Yt−1)) +
1
d1(M) + 1
∑
t∈S
(Rˆ(Y )− Rˆ(Y ∪ {t}))
)]
≤ E
Vˆ
[
max
S:S∪Y∈I
(∑
t∈S
(Vˆt − τ(t|Yt−1)) +
1
d1(M) + 1
(Rˆ(Y )− Rˆ(S ∪ Y ))
)]
.
(21)
Now, Rˆ(Y ) − Rˆ(S ∪ Y ) ≤ d1(M)Rˆ(Y ), because if M is the free matroid then
Rˆ(Y ) = Rˆ(S ∪ Y ) and d1(M) = 0; otherwise, −Rˆ(S ∪ Y ) ≤ 0 and d1(M) = 1.
Therefore, we can rearrange (21) to get
Rˆ(Y )−
d1(M)
d1(M) + 1
Rˆ(Y ) ≤ E
Vˆ
[
max
S:S∪Y∈I
∑
t∈S
(Vˆt − τ(t|Yt−1))
]
. (22)
Now, recall that each Vˆt takes value y
∗
t − πt with probability x
∗
t , and value −πt
otherwise. Without the constraint that S ∪ Y ∈ I, the RHS of (22) would equal∑T
t=1 x
∗
t [y
∗
t − πt − τ(t|Yt−1)]
+. Therefore, the RHS of (22) can be at most this
value, completing the proof. 
Proof (of Proposition 3). Our algorithm and analysis from Theorem 1 only re-
quired that the values of x∗t satisfy (8)–(9), and that y
∗
t corresponds to the
average value of Vt on an x
∗
t -fraction of sample paths. We verify that all of this
is still true for the ex-ante’s values of x∗t , y
∗
t .
(8) follows immediately from LP constraint (14) and the definition of x∗t .
To check (9), consider any t = 1, . . . , T and S = {t′ < t : {t, t′} ∈ E}. An
agent t′ < t can only be adjacent to t if there exists j ∈ Ut∩Ut′ such that interval
I
j
t′ ∋ t, i.e. agent t
′ lapses time t on resource j. Therefore, S can be partitioned
into |Ut| sets where the agents t′ in each set all lapse time t on some resource j. By
LP constraint (15), the sum of values of x∗t′ for the agents t
′ in the same set is at
most 1. Therefore,
∑
t′∈S x
∗
t′ ≤ |Ut|. Since |Ut| ≤ d for all agents t, constraints (9)
hold with the RHS replaced by d. The proof of Theorem 1 (specifically, that of
Lemma 2) holds with maxt α(G[{t′ < t : {t, t′} ∈ E}]) = d2(G) replaced by d.
Finally, y∗t equals the average value of Vt on its top x
∗
t quantile, which can
be directly checked from its definition and the fact that xtk was an optimal LP
solution. Therefore, we can invoke Theorem 1 to complete the proof. 
Proof (of Proposition 4). The LP is polynomially-sized except for the exponen-
tial family of constraints (14). This family of constraints define the matroid
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polytope and can be efficiently separated over, assuming oracle access to the
matroid rank function (note that this is a submodular function minimization
problem). Furthermore, using the GLS ellipsoid method, separation implies that
the LP can be solved to optimality and hence the vectors x∗, y∗ can be com-
puted. For further background on these results, we refer to [12, Sec. 14.3] and
[9].
Since x∗ lies in the matroid polytope defined by (8), which is integral [12,
Sec. 13.4], x∗ can indeed be represented by a distribution over independent sets.
Furthermore, there are explicit rounding procedures for doing so, which can
compute a small convex combination of independent sets equaling x∗ assuming
an oracle to the matroid [4] (note that a convex representation with at most T+1
sets exists, by Caratheodory’s theorem [12, Sec. 3]). Therefore, the restricted
prophet’s distribution Dˆ has small support and can be explicitly constructed in
polynomial time, which allows us to efficiently evaluate the expectation over Vˆ
in the definition of the residual Rˆ, and hence efficiently run our algorithm. 
Proof (of Proposition 5). Consider any correlated distribution for V1, . . . , VT and
prophet selection rule. Set xtk to be the probability that the prophet accepts
agent t when her valuation realizes to vk, for all t and k. We argue that this
forms a feasible solution to the LP. The constraints (14)–(15) follow from the
linearity of expectation, since the prophet must select a set that is independent in
both the matroid and the graph on every realization (note that the edges in the
graph are defined so that that the interval constraints (15) are indeed satisfied
by the {0, 1}-incidence vector of any independent set in the graph). Meanwhile,
xtk ≤ pkt because the marginal probability that the valuation of agent t is v
k is
at most pkt . Finally, the objective value of the LP equals the expected welfare of
the prophet. Since the prophet corresponds to a feasible LP solution, the optimal
LP solution can be no less, completing the proof. 
Proof (of Proposition 6). Let G = (N,E) be the graph where {i, i′} ∈ E if
I
j
i ∩ I
j
i′ 6= ∅ for any resource j. Then, an item i ∈ Nt can be allocated if and only
if none of its neighbors are allocated. Therefore, a set of items is independent in
the graph if and only if it is a feasible allocation.
We show d2(G) ≤ d. Consider any i ∈ Nt, and let S = {i′ ∈ Nt′ : {i, i′} ∈
E, t′ < t} be the neighbors of i that come before time t that “blocks“ i. We
must show that the largest independent set in the graph G[S] contains at most
d nodes. Since every neighbor of i uses at least one resource in common with i,
we can partition S into |Ui| sets based on which resource they have in common.
(If a neighbor has more than one resource in common with i, then choose one of
the resources at random.) Each set in the partition form a clique in the graph,
since they all share a resource in common and their intervals overlap at time t.
Therefore, an independent set in the graph G[S] can contain at most one item
from each of the sets in the partition. Thus, α(G[S]) ≤ |Ui| ≤ d. 
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C Proof of Theorem 2
The proof structure is similar to that of Theorem 1. Lemmas 3 and 4 are anal-
ogous to Lemmas 1 and 2, respectively. Propositions 7 and 8 also correspond to
Propositions 1 and 2.
Lemma 3. The algorithm earns at least 1d1(M)+1 times the welfare of the re-
stricted prophet. That is, ALG ≥ 1d1(M)+1 Rˆ(∅).
Proof. Let Yt ⊆ Nt be the random variable corresponding to the set of items
allocated to agent t by the algorithm, and let Y t = Y1∪· · ·∪Yt. The algorithm’s
expected welfare equals
ALG = E
[
T∑
t=1
(vt(Yt)− τ(Yt|Y t−1)) +
T∑
t=1
τ(Yt|Y t−1)
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
(vt(Yt)− τ(Yt|Y t−1)) +
1
d1(M) + 1
T∑
t=1
(Rˆ(Y t−1)− Rˆ(Y t−1 ∪ Yt))
]
=
1
d1(M) + 1
Rˆ(∅) + E
[
T∑
t=1
(vt(Yt)− τ(Yt|Y t−1))
]
−
1
d1(M) + 1
E[Rˆ(Y T )],
(23)
where the second equality follows from the definition of τ , and the third equality
follows from the fact that Y t−1 ∪ Yt = Y t for all t, causing the latter sum to
telescope.
Proposition 7.
1
d1(M) + 1
Rˆ(Y T ) ≤
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pkt
∑
S⊆Nt
xk∗t (S)max
J⊆S
(
∑
i∈J
uˆkt (i, S)− τ(J |Y t−1)).
Proof (of Proposition 7).
Rˆ(Y T ) = Ev∼D∗ [ max
J⊆Alloc∗(v)
Y T∪J∈I
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈Jt
uˆkt (i,Alloc
∗(v)t)]
= Ev∼D∗ [ max
J⊆Alloc∗(v)
Y T∪J∈I
( T∑
t=1
(
∑
i∈Jt
uˆkt (i,Alloc
∗(v)t)− τ(Jt|Y t−1)) +
T∑
t=1
τ(Jt|Y t−1)
)
]
(24)
Fix any J = (J1, . . . , JT ) such that J ∪ Y T ∈ I. The residual function Rˆ is
submodular by [11]. That is, for all subsets S and S′, Rˆ(S ∪ S′) + Rˆ(S ∩ S′) ≤
Rˆ(S) + Rˆ(S′). Applying this inequality repeatedly yields the following:
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T∑
t=1
τ(Jt|Y t−1) =
1
d1(M) + 1
T∑
t=1
(Rˆ(Y t−1)− Rˆ(Yt−1 ∪ Jt))
≤
1
d1(M) + 1
T∑
t=1
(Rˆ(Y T ∪ Jt−1)− Rˆ(Y T ∪ Jt))
≤
1
d1(M) + 1
T∑
t=1
(Rˆ(Y T ∪ J1 ∪ · · · ∪ Jt−1)− Rˆ(Y T ∪ J1 ∪ · · · ∪ Jt))
≤
1
d1(M) + 1
(Rˆ(Y T )− Rˆ(Y T ∪ J)). (25)
Now, Rˆ(Y T ) − Rˆ(Y T ∪ J) ≤ d1(M)Rˆ(Y T ), because if M is the free matroid
then Rˆ(Y T ) = Rˆ(Y T ∪ J) and d1(M) = 0; otherwise, −Rˆ(Y T ∪ J) ≤ 0 and
d1(M) = 1. Therefore, we substitute (25) into (24) and rearrange to get
Rˆ(Y )−
d1(M)
d1(M) + 1
Rˆ(Y ) ≤ Ev∼D∗ [ max
J⊆Alloc∗(v)
Y T∪J∈I
T∑
t=1
(
∑
i∈Jt
uˆkt (i,Alloc
∗(v)t)− τ(Jt|Y t−1))]
1
d1(M) + 1
Rˆ(Y ) ≤ Ev∼D∗ [
T∑
t=1
max
Jt⊆Alloc∗(v)t
(
∑
i∈Jt
uˆkt (i,Alloc
∗(v)t)− τ(Jt|Y t−1))]
≤
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pkt
∑
S⊆Nt
xk∗t (S)max
J⊆S
(
∑
i∈J
uˆkt (i, S)− τ(J |Y t−1)).
The second step follows from loosening the constraint on J under the max op-
erator, and the final step opens up the expectation using pkt = Pr(vt = v
k
t ) and
xk∗t (S) = Prv∼D∗(OPT(v)t = S|vt = v
k
t ). 
Proposition 8.
E[
T∑
t=1
(vt(Yt)−τ(Yt|Y t−1))] ≥ E[
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pkt
∑
S⊆Nt
xk∗t (S)max
J⊆S
(
∑
i∈J
uˆkt (i, S)−τ(J |Y t−1))].
Proof (of Proposition 8). It is useful to define a mapping φk
t,Y t−1
: 2Nt → 2Nt
as:
φk
t,Y t−1
(S) =
{
argmaxJ⊆S(
∑
i∈J uˆ
k
t (i, S)− τ(J |Y t−1)) S ∈ F
∅ S /∈ F
φk
t,Y t−1
(S) represents the subset of S which maximizes the “surplus” at time
t and valuation k, when Y t−1 are the items that have been allocated. Note
that S is not necessarily feasible when Y t−1 has already been allocated, but
φk
t,Y t−1
(S) ∪ Y t−1 is independent in M at time t, since τ(J |Y t−1) = −∞ if
J ∪ Y t−1 is not independent in M . Define
φ¯k
t,Y t−1
(S) = {i ∈ φk
t,Y t−1
(S) : i ∪ Y t−1 independent in G, u
k
t (i, S) ≥ πt(i)}
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to be the subset of φk
t,Y t−1
(S) that is independent in G and whose value is above
the threshold πt(i).
We decompose the LHS as E[
∑T
t=1(vt(Yt) −
∑
i∈Yt
πt(i) − τ(Yt|Y t−1))] +
E[
∑T
t=1
∑
i∈Yt
πt(i)] and analyze the two expectations separately.
We use the definition of the algorithm (20) to re-write the first expectation:
E[
T∑
t=1
(vt(Yt)−
∑
i∈Yt
πt(i)− τ(Yt|Y t−1))]
=E[
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pkt max
S⊆Nt:S feasible
(vkt (S)−
∑
i∈S
πt(i)− τ(S|Y t−1))]. (26)
For any S, since φ¯k
t,Y t−1
(S) is feasible, the algorithm has a higher surplus
than had φ¯k
t,Y t−1
(S) been taken:
max
S⊆Nt:S feasible
(vkt (S)−
∑
i∈S
πt(i)− τ(S|Y t−1))
≥ vkt (φ¯
k
t,Y t−1
(S))−
∑
i∈φ¯k
t,Y t−1
(S)
πt(i)− τ(φ¯
k
t,Y t−1
(S)|Y t−1). (27)
The property (18) of XOS valuations gives us vkt (φ¯
k
t,Y t−1
(S)) ≥
∑
i∈φ¯k
t,Y t−1
(S) u
k
t (i, S),
since φ¯k
t,Y t−1
(S) ⊆ S. We use this property and take a convex combination of
(27) over subsets S ⊆ Nt. (26) becomes:
E[
T∑
t=1
(vt(Yt)−
∑
i∈Yt
πt(i)− τ(Yt|Y t−1))]
≥E[
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pkt
∑
S⊆Nt
xk∗t (S)
( ∑
i∈φ¯k
t,Y t−1
(S)
(ukt (i, S)− πt(i))− τ(φ¯
k
t,Y t−1
(S)|Y t−1)
)
]
≥E[
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pkt
∑
S⊆Nt
xk∗t (S)(
∑
i∈φk
t,Y t−1
(S)
Feas
G(Y t−1 ∪ {i})uˆ
k
t (i, S)− τ(φ
k
t,Y t−1
(S)|Y t−1))].
(28)
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The last step uses the definition of φ¯k
t,Y t−1
(S) and the fact that τ(φ¯k
t,Y t−1
(S)|Y t−1) ≤
τ(φk
t,Y t−1
(S)|Y t−1). The second expectation can be rewritten as
E[
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈Yt
πt(i)] = E[
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈Yt
∑
t′>t
K∑
k′=1
pk
′
t′
∑
S′⊆Nt′
xk
′∗
t′ (S
′)
∑
i′∈S′
uˆk
′
t′ (i
′, S′)1({i, i′} ∈ E)]
= E[
T∑
t′=1
K∑
k′=1
pk
′
t′
∑
S′⊆Nt′
xk
′∗
t′ (S
′)
∑
i′∈S′
uˆk
′
t′ (i
′, S′)[
∑
t<t′
∑
i∈Yt
1({i, i′} ∈ E)]],
(29)
after applying the definition of πt(i) from (19) and switching sums. At time t
′,
i′ is dependent in G if and only if there was an item i with {i, i′} ∈ E that was
allocated at an earlier time step. Therefore, the term in the square brackets in
(29) is greater than 1− FeasG(Y t′−1 ∪ i
′).
Recombining (28) and (29):
E[
T∑
t=1
(vt(Yt)− τ(Yt|Y t−1))]
≥E[
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pkt
∑
S⊆Nt
xk∗t (S)(
∑
i∈φk
t,Y t−1
(S)
uˆkt (i, S)− τ(φ
k
t,Y t−1
(S)|Y t−1))]
≥E[
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
pkt
∑
S⊆Nt
xk∗t (S)max
J⊂S
(
∑
i∈J
uˆkt (i, S)− τ(J |Y t−1))].
The last inequality uses the definition of φk
t,Y t−1
(S) and the fact that xk∗t (S) =
0 for all S /∈ F , since the prophet cannot take such an S. 
Equipped with Propositions 7–8, the proof of Lemma 3 now follows from
(23). 
Lemma 4. The restricted prophet earns at least 1d2(G)+1 times the welfare of
the actual prophet. That is, Rˆ(∅) ≥ 1d2(G)+1 · OPT.
Proof. By the definition of Rˆ(∅), we have
Rˆ(∅) =
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
p
k
t
∑
S⊆Nt
x
k∗
t (S)
∑
i∈S
(ukt (i, S)− pit(i))
+
≥
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
p
k
t
∑
S⊆Nt
x
k∗
t (S)
∑
i∈S
u
k
t (i, S)−
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
p
k
t
∑
S⊆Nt
x
k∗
t (S)
∑
i∈S
pit(i)
=OPT−
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
p
k
t
∑
S⊆Nt
x
k∗
t (S)
∑
i∈S
[∑
t′>t
K∑
k′=1
p
k
′
t′
∑
S′⊆Nt′
x
k
′∗
t′ (S
′)
∑
i′∈S′
uˆ
k
′
t′ (i
′
, S
′)1({i, i′} ∈ E))
]
,
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where the last step uses the definition of OPT and πt(i). Next, we move all the
summations within the square brackets to the front:
Rˆ(∅) ≥ OPT−
T∑
t′=1
K∑
k′=1
p
k
′
t′
∑
S′⊆Nt′
x
k
′∗
t′ (S
′)
∑
i′∈S′
uˆ
k
t′(i
′
, S
′)[
∑
t<t′
K∑
k=1
p
k
t
∑
S⊆Nt
x
k∗
t (S)
∑
i∈S
1({i, i′} ∈ E))].
For a fixed t′ and i′, the prophet solution satisfies (17) with S = {i ∈ Nt :
{i, i′} ∈ E, t < t′}. Therefore, the term in the square brackets is less then
α(G[S]) ≤ d2(G) by definition of d2(G). Then,
Rˆ(∅) ≥ OPT−
T∑
t′=1
K∑
k′=1
pk
′
t′
∑
S′⊆Nt′
xk
′∗
t′ (S
′)
∑
i′∈S′
uˆk
′
t′ (i
′, S′)[d2(G)]
≥ OPT− d2(G)Rˆ(∅).
Rearranging yields Rˆ(∅) ≥ 1d2(G)+1OPT. 
